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Abstract 
Rancière’s work on education is becoming widely known, but it must be understood 
in its context to avoid any misleadingly conventional readings and to grasp its 
general importance. The work on industrial history is obviously connected, but so 
are the more technical academic criticisms of Althusser, Bourdieu and Marx. These 
add considerably to conventional discussion by identifying a crucial contradiction 
between emancipatory goals and necessary hierarchies based on expertise. 
Rancière’s work on aesthetics as a democratic arena has inspired some recent 
educational experiments in participation. His historical research can also be seen as 
providing support for current educational struggles against neoliberalism. Rancière’s 
methods are assessed critically in turn, and the connections with Foucault can be 
seen to both unify the work overall and raise difficulties of its own. 
Keywords: Rancière, Althusser, Bourdieu, emancipatory education, Foucault, 
Marx
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Resumen 
La obra de Rancière sobre educación se está llegando a conocer ampliamente. Pero 
debe entenderse en su contexto para evitar lecturas falazmente convencionales y 
para aprehender su importancia general. Su trabajo sobre historia industrial está 
obviamente relacionado, así como lo están las críticas a Althusser, Bourdieu y Marx. 
Éstas contribuyen considerablemente a las discusiones convencionales al identificar 
contradicciones cruciales entre los objetivos de emancipación y la jerarquía 
necesaria basada en el conocimiento. El trabajo de Rancière sobre estética como 
esfera democrática ha inspirado algunos experimentos educacionales recientes sobre 
participación. Su investigación histórica también puede verse como un apoyo a las 
presentes luchas de la educación contra el neoliberalismo. Se evaluarán 
rigurosamente los métodos de Rancière en orden, y sus conexiones con Foucault, las 
cuales al mismo tiempo unifican la obra en general y presentan dificultades propias.. 
Palabras clave: Rancière, Althusser, Bourdieu, educación emancipadora, 
Foucault, Marx
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he Ignorant Schoolmaster (Rancière, 1991) concerns the 
activities and principles of Joseph Jacotot, an educationalist in 
Belgium and France in the 1830s.  Rancière merges his voice 
with that of Jacotot in an interesting way in his account. Jacotot 
and the students had no shared language, and Jacotot began by giving them 
a popular classic text published in both French and Dutch.  Students had to 
memorise each page of the text to teach themselves French and were 
regularly tested on their knowledge.  To his surprise, apparently, Jacotot 
found that students were able to develop fluency in French using this 
method.  External assessors agreed that students had produced work of an 
acceptable quality.  
Jacotot/Rancière argued that people were perfectly capable of learning 
for themselves without the usual skilled pedagogy, therefore.  Indeed, they 
learned even if pedagogues themselves knew nothing about the subject. 
There must be a fundamental equality of intelligence among human beings 
of whatever social station. Knowledge could also be developed in any 
direction by a process of linking the new to what was known already.  Both 
claims contrast strongly with those of conventional models which involved 
specialist skilled and sequential explication.  
Rancière’s comments look like the well-established attack on traditional 
methods of teaching, another confirmation of the fundamental intelligence, 
equality, and creativity of children  The idea that emancipatory knowledge 
can be developed from making connections between what is known and 
unknown can seem like one of the classic defences of non-disciplinary 
‘discovery’ or project–based pedagogies.   
However, Jacotot/Rancière also suggests features that would not be so 
popular with modern progressives. There is a demand that students 
undertake rote learning, for example, and be tested frequently on their 
knowledge. This is learning focused on definite objects or images, on ‘a 
third thing – a book or some other piece of writing – alien to both [parties] 
and to which they can refer’ (Rancière 2011b, p. 15). There are no excuses: 
rote learning was boring, for example, but student laziness had to be 
countered. When students dismissed academic learning as elitist, Jacotot 
pointed out that their own pride in their common sense or their practical 
expertise was also elitist, and, very often, showed strong contempt for 
‘ordinary people’.    
T 
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Most current educational thinking would see possessing technical or 
academic knowledge as the only acceptable basis for authority. Certainly 
the alternatives seem undesirable –teachers can also claim authority based 
on their age, social class, gender or ethnicity, but none of these can be 
supported in modern education. Charismatic authority is also possible but 
unpredictable: if Jacotot relied on it, it is not surprising that the method 
could not be duplicated or institutionalized. 
However, conventional explication depends on expert insights to 
diagnose the difficulties and suggest effective and well-founded 
emancipatory remedies. The problem is that expertise also produces 
permanent hierarchical relations between teacher and taught, because the 
ignorant can never catch up and bridge the gap between themselves and 
their teachers. Indeed, expert pedagogues have a specialist explanation of 
ignorance which leads them to diagnose it in a range of behaviours, and to 
suspect it is ever-present. They are also constantly developing their own 
expertise, maintaining the gap between themselves and those progressing 
through earlier stages. This contradiction between emancipatory goals and 
hierarchical processes is the major critical theme in much of Rancière’s 
other work, it can be argued. 
 
Misrecognising Rancière’s Critique? 
 
Rancière himself was active in the student movement in France in 1968, 
and once admired Maoist practice that saw university academics forced to 
do manual labour, and to teach subjects in ways that were radically 
accessible to the masses, instead of following the normal scholarly routes to 
personal reward (Rancière, 1974). Rancière withdrew his support later, but 
‘equal intelligence’ was originally a Maoist slogan (Bosteels, 2011, p. 28). 
Abstracting the work on education from its context in radical politics 
clearly offers risks. Biesta advocates dissensus, 'an interruption of the police 
order' in Rancière’s terms (2010, p.  59) to revitalize university politics.  It 
is probable that he does not mean radical university politics, of the kind that 
Rancière once embraced, or even contemporary forms of student strikes and 
occupations, but without specification a call for more interest in educational 
politics could mean anything. After all, neoliberal policies have 
successfully introduced dissensus into the modern university, some of them 
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in the name of disrupting the existing conservative order. 
This political element of context is sometimes (mis)recognised in a more 
technical direction. Biesta (2010, p. 40) notes that the work on Jacotot and 
pedagogy is connected to 'Marxist notions of ideology and false 
consciousness'.  However, Biesta does not pursue this critical work very far, 
claiming limited time and space.  Biesta (2010, p. 44) refers us instead to 
Eagleton’s textbook on ideology and quotes him as saying:  
 
all thought is socially determined—following Karl Marx's dictum 
that "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being 
but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their 
consciousness"—but also, and more importantly…  ideology is 
thought "which denies this determination"  
 
Biesta contrasts this reductionist economism with its usual opposite in 
liberal thought -- ‘the assumption of the equality of all human beings' 
(2010, p. 57). This looks like a common rhetorical device where essential 
equality is opposed to a reductionist ‘economism’ as the only apparent 
alternative: the two extremes are linked in an ‘ideological couplet’ 
(Althusser & Balibar 1975). For Marxists, essentialism is equally reductive, 
however, and tautological. Idealist analyses consist of endlessly 
‘recognizing’ the selected essential quality in concrete cases, but what is 
defined as essential is itself really a generalization based on limited 
experience. Any concrete analysis can only reflect this essentialism back in 
a ‘mirror structure’, as Althusser’s (1972) critique of Rousseau shows.  
Rancière could also be open to the charge of essentialism: he does seem 
to embrace the notion of equal intelligence as ‘a presupposition or axiom’ 
(Biesta 2010, p. 51). This axiom is then constantly recognized, at work in 
pedagogy and utopian socialism in 1830s France, in French university 
politics in the 1970s, and in contemporary critiques of aesthetics, in a way 
that risks mirroring or tautology.  
However, Rancière himself did not accept Marx’s words as anything 
other than a preliminary polemic, and he suggests that Marx went on to 
argue that the classic philosophical conceptions of materialism and idealism 
both ‘belonged to the same theoretical configuration’ and needed to be 
opposed by a new politicized conception of materialism ‘founded on the 
human history of production’ (Rancière, 2011a, p. 12—13).   
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 Here and elsewhere, if we pursue these issues into Rancière’s actual 
work, we can see the ways in which it differs from liberal educational 
thought.  We will also not be limited to revisiting the eternal struggle 
between ‘traditional’ and ‘progressive’, a likely tendency noted in Biesta’s 
article itself (Biesta 2010, p. 59). 
 
Historical studies 
 
Rancière’s account of Jacotot’s approach is clearly linked to his discussion 
of socialist politics in the 1830s in France.  However, this work is also a 
critique of Marx, since neither Marx nor Engels saw potential in the forms 
of personal resistance or of Christian and utopian socialism that were 
emerging in that period, often among craftsmen and skilled workers. The 
reasons for this lie in the contradiction identified earlier between expert 
diagnosis and Marxist politics: if we consider such politics as involving an 
informal pedagogy to explain the implications of the theory, connections 
with the work on Jacotot become clear. 
Those early political movements showed the critical potential that 
interests Rancière.  In particular, some early socialists, formed around 
figures such as Saint-Simon and Fourier, developed the beginnings of a 
theory of surplus value, without referring to Marx. They noted  employers’ 
excessive annoyance at workers taking days off to celebrate ‘Saint 
Monday’, and worked out that although this saved a day’s wages, 
absenteeism must also deprive the employer of a surplus generated by each 
day’s labour (2012, p. 56). Other workers, engaged in building the new 
‘optical prisons’, were able to record a critique of the new totalising 
disciplinary regimes they implied (88), as anticipations of Foucault (1977).  
Above all, workers displayed aesthetic sensibilities, expressed in pride 
in their work, or joy in walks in the countryside, and in their dreams of a 
better life. What made this seditious was their demand for full recognition 
as human beings, for encounters with others as fully human.  Those workers 
were able to support their challenges by exploiting the ambiguities of 
liberal and other humanist arguments. For Marx, and later disciples like 
Althusser, however, those arguments were ideological and only Marxist 
science would produce emancipation.   
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Marx and Materialism 
 
To deepen his critique, Rancière (2004) begins with the thesis in Marx and 
Engels that only the proletariat, the industrial working class organised as a 
mass, is capable of successful revolution against capitalism.  Marx and 
Engels (1848) saw the growth of the proletariat as the result of a 
polarisation of social life, a concrete and visible contradiction, rooted in the 
development of modern industry with its stark divisions between workers 
and owners.  Until this contradiction deepened, all sorts of misguided 
policies would emerge, where workers compromised with the bourgeois 
order, and these included the positions adopted by French socialists in the 
1830s. 
Marx certainly attacks Proudhon as an inadequate scholar, scornfully 
rebuking him for reducing the full impact of the radical notion of 
contradiction, to the banalities of bourgeois dualism:  ‘For him the dialectic 
movement is... [merely]...the dogmatic distinction between good and bad’ 
(Marx 1847, chapter 2, 4th observation). In a subsequent letter (Marx, 
1865) he remarks that misunderstandings arose inevitably from Proudhon’s 
‘lack of German’. He goes on to add, sarcastically: ‘After my expulsion 
from Paris Herr Karl Grün continued what I had begun [teaching Proudhon 
about Hegelianism]. As a teacher of German philosophy he also had the 
advantage over me that he himself understood nothing about it’. There is no 
support for ignorant schoolmasters here!  
In order to achieve communism, Marx and Engels argued, the proletariat 
must first be prepared to lose everything, for theoretical as well as political 
reasons. Material circumstances determined ideas in capitalism, and even 
radical thought alone could never escape capitalist limits. Capitalism itself 
must be smashed before we can all philosophize without constraint. This 
critique is paradoxical, though, Rancière insists. Marxist materialism is 
excellent as a critical tool to expose as ideological the universalistic claims 
of rival philosophies, but it is open to the familiar critique that it must be an 
ideology itself, equally explicable as a normal worldview produced by 
certain social conditions.   
Proletarian revolution did not take place in 1848, so the analysis could 
not be validated. Worst still, in France in 1851, Napoleon III came to power 
and he was supported by bourgeois and worker groups, as well as financiers 
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and peasants.  Rancière says Marx (1852) saw Bonapartism as a failure of 
nerve by the bourgeoisie, who refused to assume their proper historic role 
as dominant class in France, even though the conditions were theoretically 
optimal. However, Marx came to reconsider Napoleon’s regime as enabling 
French capitalism to modernize, to put it back on track for the eventual 
crisis after all, which rescued the theory, temporarily at least.  
Rancière notes that Marx and Engels were still hoping that polarization 
and collapse would occur, well into the late 19th Century, after events such 
as the expansion of trade in the Americas, or the Austro-Prussian War, both 
of which they thought would produce deep crises. They were continually 
disappointed, not least by the eagerness of British workers to seek their 
fortunes in the gold rushes in California and Australia and to recreate the 
bourgeois order there. 
Disillusioned, Marx threw himself into scholarly work, writing Capital 
as an expert, ‘scientific’ account for posterity. Even here, Rancière (2004) 
insists, Capital offers a rather odd science: it could not rely on mere facts 
and figures, or laws and predictions for that matter, because these 
arguments could be misunderstood or, worse, interpreted conventionally. It 
also featured political infighting -- Rancière sees the famous discussion of 
the secret dual nature of commodities as aimed at Proudhon’s notion of 
worker cooperatives naively exchanging goods as much as at bourgeois 
political economy.  As the increasingly frail Marx developed a consoling 
‘sacrifice ethic’, in modern terms, his changing priorities became  clear – he 
would spend his time deepening his expertise, exhaustively reading the 
work on agrarian ground rents, say, at the expense of any direct 
involvement in politics. 
 
Althusser, Science and Ideology 
 
In a more contemporary version of the debate, Althusser’s essay on 
‘ideological state apparatuses’ (Althusser, 1977) became well known 
among educationalists in particular, since it nominated the education system 
as one of the major apparatuses.  The argument showed that ideology could 
be embedded in practices as well as ideas (Rancière claims that he 
suggested this to Althusser, and reference to 'a power organized in a 
number of institutions' appears in Rancière. 1974, p. 6).   
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Althusser’s notion of ‘ideology in general’ turned on the practices by 
which people came to think of themselves as free individuals.  The 
education system showed the mechanism at its most effective, although 
Althusser borrowed terms to describe the process from the operation of the 
Church (‘hailing’), and the legal system, (‘interpellation’).  The operations 
of these systems convinced people that they were autonomous subjects, but 
only at the price of acceptance of the process.  To develop the educational 
example, more explicitly than Althusser did, students have to subject 
themselves to the teaching and assessment system that reserves the right to 
grade them, and expresses ideological values as it does so: for those who 
succeed, there is the gratifying sense that they have become capable, 
mature, autonomous individuals.  
However, this essay was greeted in British radical circles with almost 
unanimous critique, often of an unusually personal and bitter nature.  The 
essay left no room for any sort of resistance to the operation of the 
apparatuses, by radical teachers and students in particular. To quote just one 
influential critique (Erben & Gleason, 1977, p. 73): 
 
[Althusser’s approach] fails to adequately address the processes 
through which those who work in schools may act to influence both 
the conditions of their work, and the wider social context of which 
schooling is a part...it is necessary that...teachers and students be 
regarded as important .  
 
Althusser would doubtless have replied by seeing what he called 
‘heroic’ teachers as important in a comradely and sympathetic way, but this 
sort of reaction is clearly humanist and thus open to the critique outlined 
below.  
Althusser attempted to rehabilitate Marxism as a distinct science, in the 
face of what had been the dominant humanist trend, which was to read 
Marx instead as one of a number of philosophers advocating the cause of 
‘Man’ as a free agent.  Marx’s early works did seem to offer a focus on the 
dehumanising operations of the economic system, which alienated people 
from each other, from the products of their labour, and from their very 
nature, or ‘species being’.  Alienation operated through a process of 
reification, where human constructs, like economic and social relations, 
took on a thing-like fixed quality, becoming seemingly immovable and 
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unchangeable.  However, Althusser and Balibar (1975) argued that these 
‘humanist’ readings of Marx, including Sartre’s, were mistaken, and that 
the early work was eventually to be rejected in favour of a more mature 
science, which developed distinctive concepts, especially ‘mode of 
production’. Only these concepts enabled the scientific, valid, investigation 
of concrete social and political structures.  Communist parties would use 
the findings to offer the masses the correct line in politics and steer them 
away from ideologies. 
Rancière (2011a) offers a technical critique. Ironically echoing Marx on 
Proudhon, he says that the first step in domesticating Marxism is always to 
turn it into an abstract philosophy. This process of abstraction is seen best 
in Althusser’s famous division between science and ideology, developed 
after inputs from a number of concrete sources, including a cautious 
account of science in the Soviet Union, yet looking as if it is a purely 
scholarly discovery from rereading Marx.  Althusser actually relied on other 
bourgeois philosophers of science, especially Spinoza on ‘structural 
causality’, admitted in Althusser (1976).   
Once established, the science/ideology split could then be applied to 
contemporary politics, such as defending the French Communist Party line, 
using the authority of its Marxist science against various popular forms of 
protest outside the Party. In particular, revolting students in May 1968 were 
not seen as proper revolutionaries but as promoting petty bourgeois 
ideologies and naïve spontaneism (Althusser, 2011). Rancière finally split 
with Althusser over this, seeing students in 1968 as creative thinkers 
offering new forms of emancipation, like their predecessors in the 1830s. 
Echoes of this partisanship influence his critique of Bourdieu too, as we 
shall see. 
However, there are questions for Rancière as well.  How was it that 
Althusser and even Marx could not see where their commitments were 
leading, while Rancière can? Something like a division between Rancièrian 
science and Marxist ideology is surely implied here? Rancière suggests that 
Althusser specifically turned a blind eye to some subsequent applications of 
his work, or even manipulated the possibilities himself, in the cause of the 
Party. Marx, however, incorporated personal tastes, political 
disappointment, and a resigned exclusion from activist politics in a way 
which he did not fully recognise or acknowledge. It is also possible to argue 
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that Marx and Althusser both understandably misrecognized their own 
position, but this would be particularly ironic for Rancière, since he has 
little time for the concept of misrecognition, as we shall see. In Rancière’s 
own particular case, it might have been the struggles of 1968 that provided 
the necessary experience to avoid misrecognition and intellectual 
mystification. This is workable, but it now seems that social conditions 
have to be right before critical intelligence or capacity develops, an 
important qualification to the general argument. 
Rancière seems to be basing the superiority of his stance on a conception 
of himself as some free floating intellectual above these forms of political 
commitment or bias, but his own activist commitments and preferences are 
also clear. As an example of their influence, Rancière’s persuasive ‘literary’ 
style, seen best in the historical studies, could be read as the elaborated 
views of a romantic reader of working class movements, finding 
consolation in history after his own political defeats in the 1960s and 1970s.   
Rancière’s aversion to the empirical, displayed well in his critique of 
Bourdieu, below, also leaves him rather short of current cases to analyze.  
He seems particularly incurious about modern examples of anarcho-
syndicalism, says Brown (2011), who cites arguments from modern groups 
for expert analysis of currently complex patterns of ownership and control 
instead of spontaneist movements like the workers’ occupation of single 
factories admired by Rancière in the 1960s.  As a result, the work of Marx 
and Althusser is being revalued by current activists.  
Rancière’s politics, based on the abstract axiom of equal intelligence 
makes it difficult to connect with other current political struggles, like those 
in feminism. Although his critique of Marx has helped question the 
centrality of class, prioritising gender could also be problematic. Mejia (nd) 
has argued, for example, that the specifics of the situation of groups such as 
black poor women tend to get lost.  Their position is based on their 
particular experiences of colonialism, which provided a specific identity 
produced by a complex combination of class, ‘race’ and gender. This can 
put them at odds with more purist political positions, whether those of 
white women or male anti-colonialists. The same specificity, and the need 
to represent it in personal experience has meant they are marginalized by 
Rancière’s theory as well, however, which speaks from a universalist 
position.  
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Bourdieu and Sociology as a Self-Serving ‘Science of the Hidden’ 
 
We can see in Rancière’s critiques hints of some familiar sociological 
themes, for example where it is argued that Marx seems to have mediated 
his personal experience of reformist worker organizations through a system 
of pre-established elite tastes.  We could easily see these tastes as habitual, 
that is located in a Bourdieuvian habitus, which explains their uncritical and 
immediate application to the issues.  It is therefore surprising, perhaps, to 
find Rancière critiquing Bourdieu and his sociology with the same energy 
that he displayed in his attack on Marxism. 
A structured misrecognition by the masses runs throughout all 
Bourdieu’s work, for Rancière (2004). Universities reproduce privilege for 
the dominant groups, but this goes on behind the backs of those being 
educated in schools and in universities themselves.  They are prone to see 
success as the result of particular ‘gifts’, Bourdieu and Passeron (1979) 
argued, although there is a hidden connection between educational success 
and the possession of cultural capital.  Universities can thus pose as open to 
everyone, operating on the basis of merit alone, but they conceal how their 
very operations turn privilege into merit.  This works so well that most 
people exclude themselves in advance from even applying to universities, 
on the familiar grounds that university ‘is not for them’, in a hidden 
correspondence between ‘personal’ ambition and the requirements of 
universities to reproduce the social relations of dominance.  Rancière (2004, 
p. 172) sarcastically renders this as arguing that 'the examination 
dissimulates, in its dissimulation, the continuing elimination that 
dissimulates itself in the school that pretends not to eliminate'.   
Seeing these processes as hidden clearly leaves a role for the expert 
analyst again, who alone can explain that the university curriculum is a 
‘cultural arbitrary’ with an inexplicit and elitist pedagogy, which ignores its 
most obvious ‘rational’ purpose to communicate academic knowledge.  
However, Rancière argues that the analysis itself produces the entire system 
of misrecognition as a methodological artefact, using a combination of 
invalid evidence, and deeper disciplinary loyalties and dispositions.  
Rancière focuses the methodological aspect of his critique on 
Bourdieu’s (1984) massive study of leisure patterns in France, Distinction. 
There are familiar problems affecting all empirical studies and they can be 
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found in Bourdieu’s work on education too. In Distinction, the problems are 
central. In attempting to show how taste for music varies by social class, for 
example, Bourdieu did not actually play any music to respondents, but 
rather asked them questions about musical types.  The results confirmed for 
Bourdieu that the masses disliked classical music (Rancière’s version 
would doubtless render this as being unable to appreciate elite music). For 
Rancière however, these results ignored the complexity of actual musical 
tastes:  he notes that there has always been much mixing of musical genres, 
and that classical music now appears as 'a disco hit tune, a movie 
soundtrack, or in the background of a commercial' (Rancière 2004, p. 186). 
The research itself widened social differences, and brought about 'the 
suppression of intermediaries, of points of meeting and exchange' (189).  
These charges have been much debated in discussions of Bourdieu, and, 
indeed, in Bourdieu’s own work.  Distinction is well-provided with material 
for a more sympathetic reading, for example when Bourdieu acknowledges 
that ‘certain categories were extremely heterogeneous, as regards both their 
objective characteristics and their preferences’ (1984, p. 505). Bourdieu has 
surely never been a naive empiricist, and he has always said that the point is 
to use empirical data, with as few illusions as possible, in order to test and 
develop theory.  It is a practical matter of trading the loss of precision for a 
gain in systematicity. The goal is to test hypotheses about the relations 
between choices in tastes as an indicator of the relations between social 
classes, not to offer full empirical explanations for actual tastes. He is also 
well aware that other methods are required, and, indeed, uses them: an 
initial programme of ‘extended interview and ethnographic observation’ 
(503), ongoing observations of real situations and questioning (also 
apparent in the work on education, in Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979, for 
example). Finally, there is a determined attempt to enable ‘the informed 
reader’ (1984, p. 507) to check the work for themselves. By contrast, 
Rancière simply asserts that all respondents must be producing ‘audience 
effects’, giving inauthentic answers designed to placate the questioner or 
some other imagined audience.  
However, Rancière has another dimension to his critique.  Regardless of 
any technical merits, the research depends on there being special objects of 
study -- symbolic practices -- which only sociology can study because they 
are autonomous and material enough not to be grasped by economics or 
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philosophy. Bourdieu (1996, p. 73) sees the education system as having 
central symbolic functions too, it might be added, offering 'the rite of 
institution aimed at producing a separate, sacred group', a nobility, while 
claiming to be simply technical and rational. 
In order to patrol sociology’s boundaries, Bourdieu must read 
philosophy as ideological, especially Kantian aesthetics as we shall see. 
Marxism was seen as overemphasising the role of the relations of 
production specifically, and both Marxist economics and philosophy were 
recaptured by seeing them as elements of the doxa, to be studied themselves 
as cultural phenomena. Philosophy reproduces aristocratic tastes, and 
Marxism becomes part of the general disenchantment of the bourgeois 
world, as particular cases 'of the economy of symbolic practices'  (Rancière, 
2004, p. 168). In the case of the masses, however, empirical studies are 
required of their opinions and how they are ranked.  
Rancière’s methodological and political critiques are therefore linked. 
Bourdieu’s science might reject ‘positivism’ or ‘empiricism’, but it shares 
their attempts to stabilize reality by developing discrete concepts and fixed 
‘objective’ categories of social experience. In order to study special objects 
known only to sociological experts, social and political volatility must be 
contained.   
A key aspect of the dispute with Bourdieu focuses on the 'Postscript: 
Towards a "Vulgar" Critique of "Pure" Critiques' in Bourdieu (1984). 
Bourdieu argues that the concepts of philosophy seem to be abstract ones, 
derived from carefully reading earlier philosophers, and then worked up by 
creative thought.  However, some philosophers have clearly assumed the 
value of political and social circumstances in their thought – and Plato’s 
legitimation of the Athenian social order is the favourite target here, for 
Bourdieu and Rancière. Philosophers imagine they can rise above the 
effects of their own social locations altogether. In particular Kantian 
theories of the aesthetic appear as:  
 
totally ahistorical, like all philosophical thought that is worthy of the 
name… [It is] perfectly ethnocentric, since it takes for its sole datum 
the lived experience of a homo aestheticus who is none other than the 
subject of aesthetic discourse constituted as the universal subject of 
aesthetic experience (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 493) 
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Theories of pure taste display 'an empirical social relation' nonetheless 
(Bourdieu, 1984, p. 490). An object which 'insists on being [simply] 
enjoyed' is particularly threatening to the essential human power of making 
judgments, for Kantians, because it offer  'a sort of reduction to animality, 
corporeality, the belly and sex' (489). Since this bodily experience ‘“by no 
means confer[s] credit or distinction upon its possessor”' (489), quoting 
Kant, people who enjoy it must be vulgar. This is the basis of the 
‘[essential] opposition between the cultivated bourgeoisie and the 
people…barbarously wallowing in pure enjoyment’ (490).  A pure aesthetic 
is also constantly renewed as an occupational ideology for artists, and the 
notion of pure intellectual activity has the same effect for ‘philosophy 
professors’ who want to find their place between aristocracy and labour and 
so develop a legitimizing ‘typically professorial aesthetic’: that also 
explains their activities in ‘hunting down historicism and sociologism’ 
(493).  
The legacy of Kantian approaches informs the current ‘high aesthetic’, 
the working system of pure taste in contemporary France that is researched 
and explored empirically in Distinction. Good taste is expressed in a 
commitment to formalism, an emotional detachment, a discerning 
discrimination based on an informed grasp of the formal properties of films, 
paintings or literature. It deliberately distinguishes itself from the ‘popular 
aesthetic’, based on emotional response, empathy and the enjoyment of 
content. The two approaches are illustrated by actual responses by 
respondents from different social classes seeing a photograph of an old 
woman’s worn hands.  A manual worker expressed immediate sympathy 
with the suffering represented by the gnarled fingers, whereas a Parisian 
(elite) engineer showed:  
 
an aestheticising reference to painting, sculpture, or 
literature...[which indicates]... the neutralization and distancing 
which bourgeois discourse about the social world requires and 
performs. “I find this a very beautiful photograph...It puts me in mind 
of Flaubert’s old servant-woman”’ (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 45). 
 
Rancière (2004) explains away the worker’s response as an audience 
effect again.  For him, Kant is being tactically re-read by Bourdieu to set up 
criteria which can be tested, and Rancière sees this as positivist and wholly 
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inappropriate. As before, the method squeezes out any heterogeneity or 
mixing of tastes. There is no recognition of struggles to recuperate minor 
cultures or desacralize higher ones.  Bourdieu seems unaware of past efforts 
to popularize elite culture, and he dismisses efforts the other way around, so 
to speak. When rebellious students in 1968 demanded to study popular texts 
on their university courses, for example, Bourdieu saw this only as a 
confirmation of class tastes in students, wanting to take revenge on their 
professors, or a confirmation of the superior tastes of the most 
knowledgeable bourgeois, who can manage vulgarity.  Although Bourdieu 
might disapprove of the system that upholds the opposition ‘between the 
cultivated bourgeoisie and the people’ (Bourdieu 1984, p. 490), he comes to 
support this opposition nonetheless.  
 
Aesthetics 
 
Above all, aesthetic sensibility can never be reduced to social class closure 
nor domesticated by the language of sociologists. Rancière (2002) was to 
develop the notion of the aesthetic as an autonomous area offering a unique 
medium open to all. To summarize this extensive work, Rancière (2011b) 
begins with a critique of radical forms of theatre that set out to involve the 
audience.  There we find the same division between the ignorant and the 
knowledgeable, preserved even while attempting to undermine it. The book 
goes on to argue that visual images offer the most democratic form, offering 
the most accessible ‘pensive images’, (which provoke subjective thought in 
the viewer), acting as the ‘third things’ discussed in the work on pedagogy. 
There is also admiration for modern non-representational art forms as 
having escaped conventions which then opens possible responses.  Art has 
become autonomous as far as social relations are concerned, and is 
therefore potentially universal.   
This work has inspired some recent radical experiments in aesthetic 
education and pedagogy. Rancière’s views are contrasted favourably with 
those of Freire, for example (Lewis, 2011). Freire uses images in his 
‘culture circles’, but wants them to be decoded in a prescribed manner, 
Lewis argues, rather than seeing students as 'creative interpreters and 
translators' (2011, p. 39). This contradicts Freire’s democratic goals just as 
in radical theatre. Lewis suggests instead that performance or installation art 
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offers a more promising form of open and emancipatory education.  
More conventionally, Lambert (2011) describes her project aiming 'to 
unsettle and redistribute social, cultural, political and economic power 
geometries' and to construct different knowledge spaces at Warwick 
University, UK.  Rancière’s work provided 'rich theoretical resources' 
(2011, p. 42), prompting thinking about how to transform classrooms to 
produce different 'visceral and emotional affects'.  Breaking with traditional 
ways to present research findings, a multimedia exhibition format was 
adopted instead in a new 'sensual space' (34). Students themselves had to 
make decisions about how to use the space in different situations. Effects 
were mixed and limited by the overall conventions of the University, but 
teachers and students were prompted to think differently about knowledge 
and about their roles, Lambert claims. 
Rancière (2002) himself comes closes to recognising the need for some 
sort of pedagogic intervention in these encounters, since there is a paradox 
in contemporary art. It is autonomous enough to remain critical of popular 
taste, but artistic works can become heteronomous, alien, inaccessible to the 
public, which blocks critical impact. Some sort of expert explanation is 
required to provide public access, but that would require the public to 
submit to a hierarchical relation as they would need to learn something of 
the specialist terminology of art and art criticism. Rancière does not 
immediately dismiss any expert intervention here as reproducing ignorance 
in the name of the ‘police order’. Instead, he acknowledges that there might 
be a ‘certain undecidability in the “politics of aesthetics”’ (2002, p. 151). 
Radical populism is not the only way to proceed in this case. He can only 
suggest we should proceed by ‘playing a heteronomy against an autonomy 
[and vice versa]…  Playing one linkage between art and non art against 
another such linkage’ (150).  
This looks rather abstract but it might inform the specific proposals in 
Pelletier and Jarvis (2013) discussing creative writing courses. They note 
that Rancière has also argued for the value of preserving some conventional 
artistic forms, like the narrative structure of novels, against fully avant-
garde works that risked immediate rejection as incomprehensible. Realist 
narrative in particular might be retained because it provides some sort of 
‘molar’ structure within which more challenging ‘expressive’ moments 
might be included. Overall, this is surely the familiar notion of ‘optimal 
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challenge’ in modern pedagogy, preserving a tactical balance between the 
familiar and unfamiliar. Rancière needs to revise his conception of 
pedagogy more generally, in both educational and political contexts, and 
investigate empirical practices. 
 
Rancière’s Method 
 
Rancière’s methodology rules out conventional empirical investigations, 
however. Interpreting the historical material can be taken as an illustration. 
Biesta (2010) identifies the method as involving the merging of voices, but 
this style is not used in all the other works, especially the critiques of rival 
approaches. Instead, Rancière’s method is better grasped as a kind of 
‘deconstruction’ (Reid’s Introduction to Rancière, 2012) borrowed from 
Foucault, as we shall argue below.  
Commenting on his own historical writing style, Rancière (2006, p. 20) 
says it was:  
 
necessary to blur the boundaries between empirical history and pure 
philosophy; the boundaries between disciplines and the hierarchies 
between levels of discourse. .. It was not a case of the facts and their 
interpretation...  what it came down to me to do was a work of 
translation, showing how these tales of springtime Sundays and the 
philosopher’s dialogues translated into one another.  It was necessary 
to invent the idiom appropriate to this translation and 
countertranslation...this idiom could only be read by those who would 
translate it on the basis of their own intellectual adventure.   
 
It is also clear that Rancière is not claiming any positive concrete 
findings from his historical review. These would be ‘“impossible”’ (Reid’s 
Introduction to Rancière, 2012, p. xxviii), because there could be no science 
of the emergence of socialism, and no attempt to represent with privileged 
categories the voices of the excluded and voiceless.  The only alternative 
was to offer a knowledge that at least resists the dominant tendencies to 
‘smother’ anything which is insupportable in conventional terms. 
This is obviously close to Foucault’s attempt to organize ’an insurrection 
of subjugated knowledges’, (Foucault 1980, p. 81) designed to:  
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entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, 
illegitimate knowledges against the claim of a unitary body of theory 
which would filter, hierarchise and order  them in the name of some 
true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science 
and its objects (83). 
 
Foucault’s critique of positivism is also evident in Rancière’s discussion 
of Marxist science, suggesting, more or less, that modern sciences emerge 
as discourses uniting different elements of language, practice and 
institutions. Discursive objects have their own rules of ordering, as 
'practices that systematically form the objects of which they 
speak' (Foucault, 1974, p. 49). Discursive formations relate together the 
formation of objects, concepts, subject positions and strategic choices 
(116). Specifically, Foucault (1979, p. 38) argues that we should attempt to 
uncover discursive formations as ‘systems of dispersion, regularities in 
choices’, rather than operate with categories such as science or ideology.     
 As a source of critique, Foucault could undermine any discourses 
claiming universality, including Marxism, by restoring 'the system of 
practical and discursive constraints that allowed [them] to be uttered at all'.  
This critique is itself an example of 'the expressions through which the 
struggle and questions of our present seek to give voice to a new freedom' 
(Rancière, 2011a, 124), so discursive undermining becomes a kind of 
political struggle in theory after all. Without immediate political relevance, 
Rancière once saw philosophy as merely the ‘hum of cultural chit chat' 
(Rancière 2011a, p. 113). Rancière’s early political positions included 
Maoism as we have seen, and then ‘workerist humanism’ (Reid in 
Rancière, 2012). In the ensuing absence of opportunities to practise his own 
radical politics, perhaps Foucault helped provide a more abstract and 
academic alternative in the politics of discourses. 
A discursive turn could also underpin Rancière’s demand for radical 
equality if we see that it is discourses, not individuals, which are 
fundamentally equal. Discourses construct their own objects and 
explanations, and there can be no hidden dimension that sociologists or 
Marxists can investigate to explain them. Individuals might suffer from 
amnesia about the processes of discursive construction, requiring the 
service of a geneaologist, but discourses must always be transparent to 
themselves ultimately. This ‘nominalism’ (Bosteels, 2011) also produces a 
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serious problem with relativism as we shall see. 
Modern politics is now a matter of forming up dissenting discourses to 
challenge boundaries established by conventional divisions of labour, 
especially the mental/manual split. Rancière says this will disrupt ‘the 
police order’. Biesta (nd) translates this into an abstract struggle for 
inclusion in education more generally, a right to have one’s voice heard 
despite discourses which disqualify. Rancière’s principles are unable to 
distinguish between these discourses, however, and could be used to 
support widely differing positions as we suggested. More generally, a 
dilemma familiar to any practising pedagogue awaits in deciding whether to 
include even those voices that would themselves not tolerate others. 
Problems with Foucault and his politics can only be discussed briefly. 
DeCerteau (1984) seems particularly appropriate here in connecting the 
methodological and the political again. Optical and panoptical procedures 
dominate Foucault’s more concrete accounts, for example, and these 
procedures somehow emerge from a huge mass of detailed policies and 
plans. But what privileges these particular procedures? For DeCerteau, 
Foucault himself imposes coherence through the exhaustive nature of 
details gathered from different sources, which leads to implicit claims for 
universality. The key technique to manage and domesticate details is 
narrative, but narrative skill is a matter of discernment or taste (which 
would obviously give Bourdieu an opening). Foucault renders his work as 
research which pretends to be 'eclipsed by the erudition and the taxonomies 
that [his theory] manipulates' (1984, p. 80). Foucault and Rancière are both 
very good at using rhetoric and detailed description -- ‘he [Foucault] makes 
what he says appear evident to the public he has in view' (79).  
For Baudrillard (1987), after Foucault everything became ‘politics’, and 
so nothing distinctive could be studied.  When Foucault announced that 
power was dispersed through social life, it became inexplicable and 
untraceable -- it disappeared. Well organized and well resourced politicians 
will continue to dominate the politics of effective compulsion, without even 
bothering to claim any symbolic dimensions to their activities.  Baudrillard 
(1987) says that Foucault (and Rancière, and perhaps even Biesta) seem to 
be assuming some Deleuzian notion of a universal, pulsating, abstract 
desire to make sense of the world, to produce unconventional and 
rhizomatic discourses, but apathy is far more common among the masses, 
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and should be seen as a political strategy itself.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Rancière’s extensive work in a number of fields can be seen as offering an 
important form of immanent critique, questioning whether egalitarian and 
emancipatory proposals still leave sources of inequality unexamined. 
Whether classic French school explication is widespread in a modern 
education system is in doubt, but current pedagogies still need analysis to 
decide whether they preserve a permanent distinction between the 
knowledgeable and the ignorant.  
The same points extend to radical theorising – even systematic and 
insightful thinkers like Althusser, Bourdieu, Freire and Marx can still 
produce contradictions and paradoxes. Marxism clearly has a 
transformative emancipatory potential, and Mills (2008) demonstrates a 
similar one in Bourdieu. However, Rancière points to a pedagogic form of 
authoritarianism in both, where the very categories central to the 
transformative process are available only to academic experts. However, 
these contradictions really need to be actively investigated in concrete 
circumstances, rather than insisting on a fundamental commitment to equal 
intelligences as a safeguard. 
There is an axiomatic and rather abstract and purist element in 
Rancière’s work, and a scholastic relativism in addressing the non-
axiomatic. This helps him develop uncompromising critiques of any 
position – but compromises are inevitable in concrete circumstances, and 
abstract critique misses that some positions are more liberating than others. 
Most of the writers he discusses operate with the paradoxes of attempting to 
work within unequal systems, rather than opting for utopian solutions, and 
this also includes most practising pedagogues. The debate with Bourdieu 
shows the options. Bourdieu operates with the data on inequality that he can 
access and with empirical techniques that have known flaws and limits. 
Rancière’s axiom of equal intelligence stays uncontaminated by any such 
flaws but he can offer only rhetoric and essentialist recognitions, using 
case-studies, often of exceptional individuals.  
Finally, many pedagogues would see the main site of workplace 
despotism these days in neoliberal managerial regimes, and Foucaldian and 
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Rancièrian analysis would be useful as a source of critique to deny their 
claims to universality. Rancière’s historical work might encourage 
pedagogues and students to demand that they are treated as knowledgeable 
human beings with a right to leisure and an aesthetic life, as much as did the 
workers in France in the 1830s. Rediscovering the ‘equal intelligence’ of 
educational personnel against managerial expertise could be useful to show 
alternatives.  
 
References 
 
Althusser, L. (1969). For Marx. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
Althusser, L. (1972). Politics and History, Part 2. New Left Books: 
London. 
Althusser, L. (1976). Essays in Self - Criticism. New Left Books.  
Althusser, L. (1977).  Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes 
Towards an Investigation). In his Lenin and Philosophy and Other 
Essays (pp. 122—76). London: New Left Books. 
Althusser, L. (2011). Student problems.  Radical Philosophy, 170, 8—15. 
Althusser, L. & Balibar, E. (1975). Reading Capital. London: New Left 
Books. 
Baudrillard, J. (1987). Forget Foucault. New York: Semiotext(e) Foreign 
Agents. 
Biesta, G. (2010). A New Logic of Emancipation: the Methodology of 
Jacques Rancière.  Educational Theory, 60, 39--59. doi: 
10.1111/j.1741-5446.2009.00345.x 
Biesta, G. (nd) Democracy, Education and the Question of Inclusion. 
University of Exeter, School of Education and Lifelong Learning, 
Heavitree Road, Exeter, EX1 2LU. 
Bosteels, B. (2011). Reviewing Rancière. Or, the persistence of 
discrepancies. Radical Philosophy 170, 25-31. 
Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: a social critique of the judgment of taste. 
London: Routledge. 
Bourdieu, P. (1988).  Homo Academicus.  Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Bourdieu, P.  (1996) The State Nobility, with the collaboration of Monique 
De Saint Martin.  Cambridge: Polity Press. 
180 Harris – Rancière: Pedagogy and Politics 
 
 
Bourdieu, P. & Passeron, J--C. (1979). The Inheritors: French students 
and their relation to culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Brown, N. (2011). Red years. Althusser's lesson, Rancière's error and the 
real movement of history. Radical Philosophy, 170, 16 – 24. 
De Certeau, M. (1984).  The Practice of Everyday Life. University of 
California Press: Berkeley. 
Erben, M. &  Gleason, D. (1977). Education as Reproduction: A critical 
examination of some aspects of the work of Louis Althusser.  In M. 
Young & G. Whitty (Eds.) Society, State and Schooling, (pp.  73—
92),  Ringmer: The Falmer Press.  
Foucault, M.  (1974). The Archaeology of Knowledge. London: Tavistock 
Publications. 
Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and Punish: the birth of the prison. 
London: Penguin Books. 
Foucault, M. (1980). Power/Knowledge. Selected interviews and other 
writings 1972—1977. Brighton: Harvester Press.  
Lambert , C. (2011) Psycho classrooms: teaching as a work of art.  Social 
and Cultural Geography 12, 27--45. doi: 
10.1080/14649365.2010.542479 
Marx, K.  (1847). The Poverty of Philosophy. Retrieved from 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/poverty-
philosophy/ch02.htm   
Marx, K. (1852). The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. Retrieved 
from http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-
brumaire/ 
Marx, K. (1865). On Proudhon: Letter to JB Schweizer. Retrieved from 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1865/letters/65_01_24
.htm 
Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1932) [1845—6] The German Ideology. Retrieved 
from http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-
ideology/ 
Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1848). Manifesto of the Communist Party. 
Retrieved from 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-
manifesto/ 
RISE – International Journal of Sociology of Education, 4(2) 181 
 
 
Mejia, L. (nd). We speak in Tongues: A Woman of Colour Critique of 
Jacques Rancière’s Political Subject. Retrieved from 
http://www.academia.edu/3575255/_We_Speak_In_Tongues_A_W
oman_of_Colour_Critique_of_Jacques_Rancières_Political_Subjec 
Mills, C. (2008). Reproduction and Transformation of the Inequalities of 
Schooling: the transformative potential of the theoretical constructs 
of Bourdieu. British Journal of Sociology of Education 29, 79-89. 
doi:10.1080/01425690701737481 
Pelletier, C. & Jarvis, T. (2103). The Paradoxical Pedagogy of Creative 
Writing.’ In O. Davies (Ed.) Rancière Now, (pp. 85—100), 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Rancière, J. (1974). On the theory of ideology (the politics of Althusser).  
Radical Philosophy 7,  2-15. 
Rancière, J. (1991). The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in 
Intellectual Emancipation. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Rancière, J. (2002). The aesthetic revolution and its outcomes: 
emplotments of autonomy and heteronomy. New Left Review 14, 
Mar. – Apr. 
Rancière, J. (2003). Politics and Aesthetics: an interview. Angelaki 8(2) 
191-21. 
Rancière, J. (2004). The Philosopher and His Poor. Durham:  Duke 
University Press. 
Rancière, J. (2006). Thinking between disciplines: an aesthetics of 
knowledge. Parrhesia 1, 1-12. 
Rancière, J. (2011a) Althusser's Lesson. London: Continuum International 
Publishing. 
Rancière, J. (2011b). The Emancipated Spectator. London: Verso. 
Rancière, J. (2012).  Proletarian Nights: The Workers’ Dream in 
Nineteenth Century France. London: Verso. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
David Ernest Harris is Emeritus professor at University of St Mark 
and St John. 
Contact Address: Direct correspondence to David Ernest Harris at 
University of St Mark and St John, Derriford Road, Plymouth, Devon 
PL6 8BH, United Kingdom. E-mail: darrisuk@gmail.com 
 
 
